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Vietnamese land-tenure policy reforms were embedded into general economic reforms (Doi Moi), 
enabling the country’s transition toward a market economy.  Since 1998, they were implemented 
incrementally together with complementary instruments such as agricultural market liberalization and 
new economic incentives.  Major steps included disentangling socialist producer cooperatives and 
assigning land-use rights to its former members, developing and adapting a national legal framework 
(Land Law), and enhancing tenure security through gender-balanced inheritable land-use certificates.  In 
addition to promoting individualized rights, successive reforms have contributed to accelerating the 
agricultural transformation process by encouraging perennial crop and agroforestry systems (and thus 
long-term leasehold), and allowing rural land rental and land sales markets to re-emerge.   
During the 1990s, combined reform efforts sped up agricultural growth and industrialization, 
thereby enhancing food security, and combating hunger and rural poverty.  Individualized rights, 
liberalized product and input markets, and a new entrepreneurial spirit resulted in intensified irrigated rice 
production, agricultural diversification, and better food quality.  Although reform achievements—
accompanied by policy interventions such as export quotas—are tremendous in terms of improved 
nutritional status and rural livelihoods, more efficient farming and agrarian structures, more secure land 
investment, access to collateralized credit, and poverty reduction, some challenges to consolidate reforms 
exist.  These challenges include addressing increased urban–rural and regional income disparities, 
landlessness resulting from emergency land sales, misuse of local elites’ power in land allocation, and 
endangered “commons” through land privatization. 
 
 




1.   INTRODUCTION 
Decollectivization and Doi Moi Reform: An Overview 
Following periods of slow growth, declined food production, and famine as an outcome of collective 
agriculture, the Vietnamese government in 1986 enacted a series of reforms to transform Vietnam from a 
centrally planned to a market-oriented economy.  This Doi Moi reform not only dismantled the rural 
collectives, but also assigned land rights to farmers.  Later, agricultural markets were liberalized, and 
even wider economic reforms were implemented.  In part, because these reforms unleashed a new 
entrepreneurial spirit that resulted in intensified rice production, diversification into new crops such as 
coffee, and improved food quality, within five years (from 1993 to 1998) the share of people living in 
poverty fell by 21 percent.  From 1993 to 2002, poverty incidence dropped from 58 to 29 percent. 
With the reforms, agricultural collectives had to contract land to households for 15 years for 
annual crops and 40 years for perennial crops.  Households were allowed to buy and sell animals, 
equipment, and machinery, and the private sector started to engage in food marketing.  Further reforms 
followed, including relinquishing control over prices and opening domestic and international markets.  As 
a consequence, agricultural growth reached 3.8 percent a year during 1989–92, and Vietnam became the 
world’s third-largest exporter of rice by 1989, alleviating national food shortages.  Agriculture became a 
driver of overall economic growth.   
While it was still difficult for farmers to grow perennial crops because long-term land rights were 
not yet secured and financial institutions refused to accept them as collateral, Vietnam passed a Land Law 
in 1993 that extended land tenure to 20 years for annual crops and 50 years for perennials.  As a result, 
GDP growth reached 7 percent a year within the period from 1993 to 2000.  Agriculture grew at 4 percent 
annually, and the nonagricultural sector grew by more than 8 percent.  Decollectivization and land titling 
have thus generated powerful incentives to invest in agriculture.  The resulting rural growth has raised 
households’ incomes and standards of living, and overall, reforms have led to greater food security and 
better nutritional status, partly through increases in rice production.   
The economic reforms pulled many Vietnamese out of poverty.  From 1993 to 2002, the 
incidence of poverty in Vietnam dropped from 58 to 29 percent.  Vietnamese farmers now work under 
more secure land rights, and reforms initiated active markets in buying, selling, and renting land.  
Moreover, because land can be transferred to more efficient farmers, farmers diversified their production 
into aquaculture, livestock breeding, and investments in trees and shrub crops. 
However, the new system does not necessarily work to everyone’s advantage.  Some rural poor 
may sell and therefore lose their land in times of emergencies; thus, the emergence of landlessness has to 
be monitored carefully.  Also, land-tenure reforms have not yet increased rural people’s access to credit as 
much as may have been expected.  One reason is that formal banking institutions still seem reluctant to 
accept land-use certificates as collateral, believing that the land will be hard to seize in case of credit 
default.  Finally, reforms have had mixed results on the environment.  On the one hand, more secure 
property rights have led farmers to adopt agroforestry and other anti-erosion measures.  On the other 
hand, strengthening people’s individual rights to land can put fragile lands at risk when land reform 
allocates rural wetlands to households who then convert them to farmland or aquaculture.  
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2.   THE PROCESS OF DECOLLECTIVIZATION AND DOI MOI REFORM IN 
VIETNAM 
Land reform and decollectivization in Vietnam has been implemented as part of the general economic 
reform (Doi Moi) of the country.  The history of this reform process goes back as far as 1954, when the 
Vietnamese Communists defeated the French, and can be divided into five periods: 
•  Historical background 1954–80: Socialist land reform and agricultural collectivization  
•  Pre-reform period 1980–88: Incentives to increase the efficiency of collective agriculture  
•  Market-oriented reform 1988–93: Land relocation to farm households and decollectivization 
•  Building market institutions 1993–2001: Land Law 1993 and new form of agricultural 
cooperatives 
•  Market reform consolidation 2001–present (2009): Land market liberalization, agricultural 
commercialization, and international integration  
The following subsections review each of these periods, focusing on approaches, processes, 
actors, and outcomes of interventions that contributed to the success of decollectivization and land reform 
in Vietnam. 
Historical Background 1954–1980: Socialist Land Reform and Agricultural 
Collectivization 
Under the Geneva Accords in 1954, Vietnam was divided into two countries with opposing ideologies: 
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north—influenced by the former Soviet Union and China 
with their socialist ideology—and the Republic of Vietnam in the south—dominated by the United States 
with its capitalist economic system.  Right after independence, both the northern and southern 
governments conducted land reforms to redistribute large landholdings—owned either by French 
plantation owners or Vietnamese landlords—to farmers (Do and Iyer 2003).    
During the war period up until 1975, the agrarian structure between North and South Vietnam 
was very different.  Northern agriculture was characterized by fragmented landholdings and small-scale 
petty commodity production even under the collective system, while southern agriculture was more 
export-oriented—highly commercialized with a production relationship based on tenancy and 
sharecropping between the landlord class and what at that time was called the rural proletariat (Watts 
1998).  In North Vietnam, as a reward for farmers’ contribution during the war for independence, in the 
mid-1950s land reform that distributed land ownership to farmers was carried out.  But right after this 
reform begun, Communist ideology gained enough strength in the late 1950s to impose a centrally 
planned model1 and forced agricultural collectivization.2
                                                       
1 Fforde and Pain (1987) named it as the DRV (Democratic Republic of Vietnam) model. This model may be sketched out in 
terms of eight features: (1) Nationalization of the major part of industry and the whole banking system; (2) Economic 
development through centralization and mandatory planning; (3) A high priority given to the medium-term plans of industry and 
within industry to increase its production of investment goods and of heavy intermediate inputs; (4) Land collectivization in 
agriculture and the establishment of cooperatives and state farms; (5) Along with the mandatory planning, state-fixed prices; (6) 
Egalitarian income distribution; (7) The allowance of foreign trade in limited amounts, linking primarily with the Council of 
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) countries and sometimes China; and (8) Limited access to foreign direct investment from 
capitalist countries.  
 Conversely, in South Vietnam in 1970, a land-
2 Even under socialist central planning and collective agriculture, the state could not establish effective control over rural 
production. Chu et al. (1992) and Beresford (1985) remark that the collective system was firmly established only in the period of 
1965–68, when there were heavy American bomb attacks that motivated traditional collective actions within the communes. 
During other times, the system worked very loosely and inefficiently as it was imposed from outside. Furthermore, the 
phenomena of “sneaky contracts” took place within the collective system since the 1960s. As a result, agricultural productivity  
3 
to-the-tiller program with a land ceiling of 20 hectares per family created a more middle-class peasantry 
and favored extensive agricultural commercialization.    
After reunification in 1975, it was apparent that the war against America left Vietnam with 
severely damaged infrastructures and enterprises.  It was estimated that 60 percent of villages were 
destroyed in South Vietnam and 70 percent in North Vietnam.  Additionally, 29 northern provinces were 
under bomb attack, in which 12 provinces were outright destroyed, including 6 big cities like Hanoi and 
Haiphong.  Four hundred industrial enterprises and the infrastructure system were seriously damaged 
(Nguyen 1990).  Despite those difficulties, Vietnam’s Communist Party (VCP) attempted to strengthen 
the centrally planned system as a model for the whole country in general,3 and large-scale agricultural 
collectivization in particular (Fforde and de Vylder 1996; VCP 1977; White 1982).  In North Vietnam, 
even since the 1974 Thai Binh Agricultural Conference,4
Along with the socialist transformation in the southern big cities,
 small-scale cooperatives were ordered to 
transform into large-scale and so-called “advanced” ones with support from the state, which invested in 
the mechanization and agricultural infrastructure systems.  The size of the cooperatives was expanded 
from hamlets with dozens of households to entire villages with hundreds of households.  In 1979, the 
average size of a cooperative in North Vietnam was 202 hectares of land, on which an average of 378 
households lived and worked.  In some cases, the advanced cooperatives included 2–3 villages with more 
than 1,000 hectares of land.  Almost 97 percent of rural northern Vietnamese households belonged to 
4,151 cooperatives (Do 1998).  The cooperatives managed resource allocation decisions about production 
and distribution in accordance with the material targets of the State Planning Committee.  As in most 
other socialist countries, cooperatives were also responsible for the provision of social services.  The basis 
of production, however, was formed by brigades, who were responsible for directing fieldwork labor; 
cooperatives provided planned targets to the brigades, who then delivered the output to them.  The system 
revolved around a detailed framework of labor categorization and norms that would formulate the 
required labor and other input needed to meet output targets, and calculate labor remuneration.  Within 
cooperatives, peasants were still allowed to retain small personal plots amounting to no more than 5 
percent of the total area of the cooperative.  Some of the output of these plots, along with the surplus 
production of the cooperative, entered the heavily regulated public and private markets either at 
“negotiated prices” offered by state trading agencies or free market prices in the “unorganized” markets 
(Chu et al. 1992; Fforde and de Vylder 1996; Dat 1997).   
5
                                                                                                                                                                           
was declining, and food shortages forced North Vietnam to live off of the support of foreign aid. 
 particularly in Ho Chi Minh 
City, southern peasant households were forced to participate in so-called “low-level” or pre-cooperatives 
that were based on labor exchange or formed “solidarity teams.” Some pilot cooperatives were also 
subsequently developed.  The purpose was to immediately strengthen the district level and prepare the 
necessary conditions to undertake rapid large-scale collectivization.  However, the practice of 
collectivization in South Vietnam was not particularly successful.  In 1979, there were only 272 
cooperatives in South Vietnam and in 1980, only 24.5 percent of farm households belonged to a 
cooperative.  In many cases, southern cooperatives were listed in the papers as notional cooperatives 
rather than cooperates that actually functioned in practice (Kerkvliet 1995; Tran 1998). 
3 There was a strong debate within the party about the pace of integration of South Vietnam into the central planning system 
in North Vietnam. Within the scope of the socialist central planning system, it would have been more beneficial to gradually set 
up institutions of a central planning system in the south. Nevertheless, in the end politics were more influential (Lang 1985; Vo 
1990).  
4 This conference was held in the Thai Binh province (located in the Red River Delta) in 1974, with the major purpose of 
reviewing agricultural collectivization, and preparing next steps for further socialist transformation in the rural sector. 
5 Socialist transformation was gradually undertaken against the industrial and commercial capitalists of South Vietnam from 
1976. The state thought that it would make full use of the productive capacity of the private sector, which it perceived as a critical 
provider of consumption goods and foreign exchange. Nevertheless, the leeway given to the private sector did not prove as 
beneficial to the economy as the state had expected. If anything, the continued existence of capitalist traders badly disrupted 
central control and distribution of necessity goods. This failure motivated the drastic move against the private sector in South 
Vietnam in March 1978. The state ordered the abolishment of all trade and business operations of bourgeois tradesmen while 
small merchants could retail those goods not controlled by the state (Lang 1985; Nguyen 1990).  
4 
Not surprisingly, collectivization in the post-unification period generated very poor agricultural 
performance.  Annual agricultural growth was very low at only 0.7 percent during 1976–80.  Specifically, 
agricultural growth declined by 0.5 and 6.6 percent in 1976 and 1977, respectively.  Food grain 
availability fell by 1.5 percent during 1976–79, despite the sharp rise in food grain imports.  Food 
procurement by the state fell from 2 million tons to 1.4 million tons during 1976–79 because farmers tried 
to avoid the state procurement system with its unfair prices, and increasingly sold output through private 
“unorganized” markets (Akram-Lodhi 2001).  It was reported that private markets offered prices 10 times 
that of the public sector (Fforde and de Vylder 1996). 
This failure of collectivization and poor agricultural performance were attributed to four major 
factors.  First and foremost was farmers’ disincentives through the collective agriculture system, which 
tied output to brigades rather than to individuals, resulting in low prices for farm output produced in 
excess of the quota (Kerkvliet 1995; Nguyen 1995).  Second, state trading agencies did not have enough 
intermediate input and consumption goods to exchange with peasant households.  Facing the unfair terms 
of trade, peasant households were discouraged from participating in an exchange with state trading 
agencies.  Third, a lack of trained managers led to cooperative inefficiencies.  Cooperative members paid 
little attention to cooperative works, and focused more on the 5 percent of land that they could use as 
personal plots to sell surpluses in the private markets6
Pre-Reform Period 1981–1988: Making Incentives to Increase Efficiency of Collective 
Agriculture 
 (Nguyen 1995; Kerkvliet 1995; Jamal and Jansen 
1998).  Finally, the macroeconomic structure was imbalanced in a way that the state highly favored the 
development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in heavy industries while neglecting the development of 
light industries, particularly agriculture.  Major shares of state investments went to heavy industries while 
those that went to agriculture were reduced to a bare minimum (Fforde and de Vylder 1996).  Taxes 
imposed on agriculture were relatively higher than those on industry.   
In the early 1980s, an economic crisis occurred due to a shortage of state commodity funds7 along with a 
decrease in Western and Chinese aid, state food procurement, and an upcoming food crisis.  In 
combination with the stabilization of foreign relations with China and the defeat of the “capitalist 
bourgeoisies” in South Vietnam, the worsening economic state led to debates within the party that 
focused on the economic sphere (Lang 1985).  Local experiments of “sneaky contract” and “fence-
breaking” phenomena
8 led the Communist leadership for the first time to officially acknowledge the 
legitimacy of individual interests alongside those of collectives and society.
9
The most radical changes occurred in the agricultural sector.  The aim to collectivize agriculture, 
resisted by peasant households in South Vietnam, was suspended.  More importantly, Directive No.  100 
of the party, famously known as Contract 100 (Khoan 100) or output contract (Khoan san pham), was 
issued on January 13, 1981 to present tactical concessions to cooperative members and therefore prevent 
the spontaneous breakdown of the unpopular agricultural cooperatives.  The output contract system 
  
                                                       
6 There is evidence that during the 1970s in parts of the country, the actual amount of cooperative land used by households 
for their small plots ranged from 7 to 13 percent of the cooperative area. This proportion was well in excess of the legal 
maximum of 5 percent (Kerkvliet 1995). 
7 Under the central planning system, market transactions and money transfers were very limited. The state played a 
dominant role in centralizing all commodities from economic agents (such as producers and consumers), then allocating them 
according to its economic plan. Therefore, the availability of the state commodity fund was critical for the state to control and 
operate the central planning system. 
8 Those phenomena were not part of the plan—they were ordered by the state due to shortages in the state commodity fund 
and low prices set up by state trading agencies. 
9 In 1977 and 1978 in the Do Son district near Haiphong, household contracts were introduced by a cooperative. Under these 
contracts, households received land from the cooperative for the cultivation of rice. Once the household fulfilled its quota 
obligations to the cooperative, it was allowed to retain the surplus as either a use-value or an exchange-value. The household was 
also encouraged to reclaim wasteland and work this land for themselves, retaining the entire output. The results were so 
impressive that in 1980 the authorities in Haiphong instructed all agricultural cooperatives to adopt the new production scheme, a 
reform that served as a prelude to countrywide reform in the 1980s.  
5 
decentralized control over much of the labor process, benefiting the cooperative members, consisting of 
mostly peasant households.  A cooperative thus distributed land to each household.  The responsibility for 
production shifted down from the level of the cooperatives to the production brigades and from the 
brigades to the peasant households, which, in principle, took over the tasks that were formerly performed 
by the cooperative, namely, the tasks of growing plants, weeding, applying fertilizer, and harvesting.  
This output contract system provided incentives for increased output by setting a production quota for the 
households, a quota that was determined on the basis of productivity of the land during the previous three 
years.  Peasant households were allowed to keep or sell surpluses on the private markets or to the state 
trading agencies at “negotiated prices” (Vo 1990).  In mid-1981, along with drastic price regulation 
measures, procurement prices for agricultural goods were increased to the same level as market prices 
(Beresford and Fforde 1996).  In addition, control stations that were established along main transportation 
routes in order to check illegal circulation of state-controlled goods, which led to the situation of ngan 
song, cam cho (river damming and market banning), were abolished (Harvie and Tran 1997).   
This partial reform was quite successful in the beginning.  Starting from 1979, agricultural growth 
accelerated at 6.6 percent per year on average during 1981–84, reaching its peak at 10.6 percent in 1982.  
Compared with the 1976–80 period, food per capita increased from 260 kilograms (kg) to 293 kg during 
1981–84.  Nevertheless, such reform measures arguably had only an ad hoc effect on output growth.  
Agricultural growth started to decelerate in 1983.  In particular, food production increased less than 1 
percent in 1983, leading to a decline in food per capita under the minimum subsistence level of 300 kg.  
Inflation accelerated at more than 60 percent per year during 1980–84.  The gap between free market and 
official prices was kept at 10 times or more (Nguyen 2006).   
Moreover, the failure of price, wage, and currency reforms
10
The poor agricultural performance, food shortages, and resulting high inflation and low economic 
growth during 1984–87 were attributed to three factors.  First, the output contract system did nothing to 
move the rural economy toward market-based prices, for either input or output.  The state trading 
agencies still tried to dominate the marketable surplus of food staples at deteriorating terms of trade,
 in 1985 deteriorated the situation 
further.  During 1985–88, the GDP growth rate was reduced to 4.6 percent on annual average.  
Agricultural growth decelerated to only 2.2 percent per annum during 1985–88 and was recorded at 
negative 1.8 percent in 1987, when food production decreased by 4.4 percent.  This led to famine in some 
provinces as food per capita was only 281 kg.  Inflation started at 91.6 percent in 1985 and accelerated to 
three-digit percentages for three years during 1986–88.  Inflation hit a staggering 774.7 percent in 1986. 
11
Second, the agricultural cooperatives still retained the ability to increase or decrease the 
cooperative members’ share of the contracted amount by altering the system of payment for the input 
assigned to both themselves and the members.
 
although peasant households, under the output contract system, were, in principle, free to sell their surplus 
in the free market (Fforde and de Vylder 1996).   
12
                                                       
10 By 1985, spiraling inflation forced a reform proposal to solve the problem of high free market prices “at a stroke,” 
because otherwise it might have further worsened the state’s control over resources. A combination of currency reform, increased 
state prices, and higher wages was introduced; however, this partial reform effort also could not help stabilize the central 
planning economy because the state could not procure enough commodities under hyperinflation due to huge in-cash subsidies to 
SOEs (Beresford and Fforde 1997). 
 In many cases, peasants returned land to the cooperatives, 
and put more effort into their personal 5 percent plots of land.  It is estimated that during 1983–87, 
peasant households received only 16–17 percent, or even 13 percent in some places, of the contract 
output, an amount that could not possibly compensate production expenses (Vo 1990).  Finally, 
agricultural stagnation was further exacerbated by insufficient state investment. 
11 This negative effect of price scissors on agricultural production was further exacerbated by the inefficiencies of the state 
distribution system. Particularly, the agricultural sector did not have enough intermediate input. Peasants received only 30 
percent of the fertilizer they needed. The quality of industrial equipment used for agricultural production was also very poor. 
12 Cooperatives still performed certain tasks, usually caring for water supply, seeds, and land preparation, which were paid 
for by the contracted amount of output. Taxes and deductions for the local schools as well as other less popular fees imposed by 
the local authorities also had to come out of the contracted amount (Fforde and de Vylder 1996).  
6 
Market-Oriented Reform Period 1988–1993: Land Relocation to Farm Households and 
Decollectivization 
A package of measures was implemented during 1987–89 that fundamentally changed the nature of 
Vietnam’s economy from a centrally planned to a market-oriented system.  While the previous partial 
reform measures had focused only on improving the efficiencies of the socialist central planning model 
and collective agriculture, this reform attacked then demolished the very foundation of the old system.  It 
was not merely a “structural adjustment,” as recommended by IMF in other developing countries, but a 
virtual revolution in the entire development concept and strategy.  It was not only the measures of 
“getting the prices right,” but “making the prices matter” (Fforde and de Vylder 1996).   
The Doi Moi reform process originated from the Sixth National Party Congress of the Vietnamese 
Community Party (VCP), held in December 1986.  Confronting high inflation, erosion of state 
institutions, and severe shortages in the economy, Doi Moi was seen essentially as a matter of life or death 
for the existence of the VCP.  As intended from the Sixth National Party Congress of the VCP, objectives 
of this reform were to: 
1.  Stabilize the economy under high inflation and serious economic imbalances 
2.  Develop the private sector  
3.  Increase and stabilize agricultural output 
4.  Shift the focus of investment from heavy to light industry 
5.  Focus on export-led growth, based on the experience of Vietnam’s dynamic regional 
neighbors 
6.  Attract foreign direct investment (FDI), seen as essential for economic development 
However, it was only since the end of 1987 that such reformist intentions had been 
consolidated—when high inflation and food shortages threatened people’s living standards and eroded the 
state’s resources.  Besides, it was clear by 1988 that Soviet aid would soon decline, implying that more 
domestic resources and changes in investment priority from heavy industry to agriculture and light 
industry were needed for economic growth.  A soft budget policy could no longer be sustained.   
In agriculture, Resolution No. 10 (popularly known as Contract 10 or Khoan Muoi), issued by the 
VCP in 1988, initiated the process of decollectivization and revived the development of the peasant 
household economy in rural areas.  Resolution 10 obliged the agricultural cooperatives to contract land to 
peasant households for 15 years for annual crops and 40 years for perennial crops.  Although the terms of 
land allocation varied across Vietnam, in most instances land was allocated on the basis of family size.  
With decollectivization, cooperatives no longer controlled capital stock, working capital, and other means 
of production.  Instead, they retained ownership of these elements, but were obliged to rent them out to 
peasant households.  Moreover, peasant households were allowed to buy their own capital stock and 
working capital irrespective of the supply available from the cooperatives.  They could thus buy and sell 
animals, equipment, and machinery.   
This resolution also stated that the proportion of the contracted amount to be left to cooperative 
members should not be less than 40 percent.  Unit prices in the contract, as well as the contract itself, had 
to be fixed for five years.  The contracts were to be signed between the peasant and the cooperative, 
whereas previously the production brigades had to be involved (Fforde and de Vylder 1996).  Households 
who did not meet the quota had to compensate the cooperatives in cash or in kind, at the market price.
13
During 1987–91, price liberalization was carried out with sequential reform measures to abolish 
the ration system and the gap between official and market prices.  Price liberalization was accompanied 
 
The quota was fixed for five years, bringing a degree of certainty to peasant households that had hitherto 
been lacking.  Peasant households also had to pay agricultural taxes equivalent to an average of 10 
percent of annual output.  Finally, and importantly, the state accepted private sector food marketing.   
                                                       
13 In fact, this eliminated the work point system, which had been retained under Directive 100.  
7 
by the opening of markets for both internal and external trade.  In 1987, internal control posts were 
abolished, accelerating trade between regions, between SOEs and private sectors, as well as between 
urban and rural sectors.  In 1988, foreign trade reform was initiated as tariffs began to replace quantitative 
restrictions.  The government then concurrently ceased its exclusive control of foreign trade through state 
trading agencies and import–export licenses.  Finally, in December 1989, to bolster the competitive 
position of the economy, the official exchange rate was sharply devalued and brought to near equality 
with the free market rate (Sepehri and Akram-Lodhi 2002). 
The reform generated positive economic results.  The inflation rate was tamed to only 36 percent 
in 1989 after accelerating at very high rates during 1986–88.
14
The improved economic performance during 1989–92 was attributed first to the leading role of 
the agricultural sector, not only in saving the country from a food crisis but also in actively contributing to 
demand acceleration and releasing foreign exchange constraints.  Arguably, market and price 
liberalization had a positive impact on the agricultural sector by improving terms of trade and income for 
peasant households, thus giving them incentives to expand production and marketable surplus.  Vietnam 
became the third largest exporter of rice in 1989 even though it had to import about 400 tons of food 
during 1987–88.  The availability of food, along with the large inflow of consumption goods due to the 
opening of foreign trade, played a positive role in taming inflation and setting up a sound base for growth 
in the industrial sector.  In addition, rice exports played an important role as the main source of foreign 
exchange earnings during this period as imports financed by foreign aid from CMEA
 Growth was accelerated first of all in 
agriculture, leading to a high demand for the construction and services sectors, which had previously been 
depressed.  During 1989–92, GDP growth was 6.1 percent on annual average, of which growth of 
agriculture and nonagriculture was 3.8 and 6.9 percent, respectively.  Despite the negative impacts of 
foreign aid cuts due to the collapse of the eastern European socialist system during 1990–91, Vietnam 
could still maintain a GDP growth of 5.1 and 5.8 percent in 1990 and 1991.  By 1992, Vietnam had fully 
recovered from the shock caused by the collapse of the socialist system, and growth climbed to an 8.7 
percent rate (Dollar 1994). 
15
However, further economic growth could not be sustained as the domestic saving and investment 
rate was still too low.
 countries ended.     
16
                                                       
14 This arose from measures to bring monetary growth under control and to stabilize the Vietnamese currency (dong), as 
well as to increase the availability of products. The monthly interest rate was raised to 12 percent in early 1989, which ensured a 
positive real interest rate. In turn, this helped absorb the monetary overhang by encouraging people to put their saving in a dong 
account instead of hoarding dollars, gold, and physical goods, all of which lower monetary velocity. The declining rate of 
inflation was also assisted by the growth of food supplies, thanks in part to the positive effect that Contract 10 contributed to 
agriculture and the availability of imported consumption goods as a result of foreign trade liberalization. Nevertheless, the 
lowering rate of inflation was not sustained in 1990–91 as the state still tried to rescue SOEs by injecting more subsidies and 
credits into them after the collapse of the CMEA. The large budget deficit and increase in money supply led to a high inflation 
rate close to 70 percent during 1990–91. Inflation was curbed again in 1992 when hard budget constraints were firmly imposed 
on SOEs. 
 More importantly, the legal and institutional framework for the efficient operation 
of the market had not been firmly established, particularly in factor markets, leading to massive rent-
seeking problems (Fforde and de Vylder 1996).  In agriculture, impacts of reform measures were limited 
to subsistence crops, and the development of commercial crops was impeded.  From the perspective of 
land policy, there were four types of limitations to the commercialization of agriculture.  First, the 
duration of land-use rights was not long enough to encourage households to invest in agricultural 
production.  Second, land transfer was not allowed, hence land acquisition by peasant households, crop 
specialization, and commodity production in agriculture were discouraged.  Third, land-use rights were 
15 The Council for Mutual Economic Assistance was established as an economic block among socialist countries during the 
1970s and 1980s and was strongly influenced by the former Soviet Union. 
16 It was claimed that the private sector, as a main source of domestic savings, was treated unfairly under new economic 
policies, discouraging the use of this important source for investment (Fforde and de Vylder 1996). In fact, share of the state 
sector in total GDP increased from 32.5 to 34.3 percent during this period. Particularly, most of the growth in the state sector was 
concentrated in heavy industries. SOEs mostly received credit from the banking system to compensate for the loss in direct 
subsidies from the state, since the state-owned commercial banks still functioned as money distributors for the state. The state 
still played a monopolistic role in foreign trade.  
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not accepted as collateral by financial institutions, so households were prevented from raising loan funds 
for agricultural investment.  Fourth, local governments still played a dominant role in deciding crop 
patterns for specific types of land.  Most of the land continued to be used for food production due to the 
emphasis placed on food security, while agricultural diversification and commercialization were not 
sufficiently encouraged. 
Decollectivization left an institutional vacuum in the rural sector since old-style cooperatives 
could not adapt to the new market system.  Many peasant households, especially poor and smallholding 
households, had difficulties in accessing production technologies, and input and capital for production, 
and these demands were not served well by the cooperatives.  Many cooperative were dismantled or 
transformed.  They survived on member contributions, which were based on the land area of each 
household, and 90 percent of cooperatives reportedly remained weak or nonfunctional.   
For food-security reasons, state trading agencies received privileged access to rice export quotas, 
which studies claim reduced substantially the farm-gate price of rice.  David (1994) estimates that state 
intervention in rice exports undervalued the domestic rice price by 25 to 30 percent, of which two-thirds 
was caused by the inability of state trading agencies to obtain the highest possible export price.  Though 
devaluation brought substantial gains to exporters, the exchange rate was still considered to be 
overvalued, hampering the incentives of exporters, particularly in the rice sector.   
Building Market Institutions 1993–2001: Land Law 1993 and New Form of Agricultural 
Cooperatives 
This period witnessed a series of efforts for international integration—starting with the 
resumption of lending from the IMF and World Bank and large inflows of FDI—and ending with 
a number of trade agreements with the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the 
United States.  Reforms continued during the period between 1993 and 2001, mainly to 
consolidate the previous policy initiatives, but at a slower pace than before.
17 After a long history 
of war, poverty, hunger, and international isolation, it was a desire of both the VCP and the 
Vietnamese people to look for economic growth, prosperity,
18
In agriculture, the 1993 Land Law built on Resolution 10 by extending land tenure to 20 years for 
annual crops and 50 years for perennial crops.  While households were limited to 3 hectares of land per 
farm for annual crops in the Red River Delta and 5 hectares per farm for annual crops in the Mekong 
Delta, for the first time the exchange, transfer, lease, inheritance, and mortgaging of land-use rights was 
permitted (Sepehri and Arkam-Lohdi 2002).  To aid in the development of the land market in the wake of 
the 1993 Land Law, a process of issuing peasant households with land-use certificates began.  By 1999, 
more than 10 million households had received certificates for agricultural land, representing about 87 
percent of peasant households and 78 percent of the agricultural land in Vietnam (ANZDEC 2000).   
 and international integration.  
After learning from the experiences of the previous Asian Tiger economies, the state actively 
opened the economy to export expansion and foreign investments, subsequently achieving high 
economic growth.  Following the idea of making the prices matter, the state also pushed ahead 
for making the prices right by conducting further market liberalization, though gradually, in the 
factor markets (particularly credit and labor markets) and developing new institutions to replace the 
previous state administrative system.    
Also in 1993, the government promulgated a range of decrees aimed at institutional reform and 
improving investment and technological innovation.  Decree 12/CP was focused on the reform of state-
owned agricultural enterprise management, while Decree 13/CP was focused on the development of 
                                                       
17 Perhaps the most significant structural reform of the period was in the area of trade policy. With the exception of rice, 
export quotas ceased. Import quotas were reduced to only seven items, and import permits were introduced for most remaining 
controlled items. 
18 Since the Eighth Party Congress, objectives of the socialist revolution became “prosperous people, strong country and 
civilized and equal societies” (VCP 1996).  
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agricultural extension services, and Decree 14/CP dealt with credit for extended agricultural and rural 
development.   
Tax reform has been another method through which the government attempted to provide greater 
incentives to the agricultural sector.  The 1993 Land Law reduced agricultural land-use tax from an 
average of 10 percent of annual output to 7 percent of annual output.  Perennial crops farmed on newly 
reclaimed land were exempted from tax.   
In March 1996, the Law on Cooperatives was approved by the National Assembly of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam, clarifying the cooperatives’ role as service providers and establishing a legal 
framework for the cooperatives within a multisectoral commercial economy.  This law originated from 
the failure of the former cooperative system, which couldn’t meet the smallholding farmers’ diverse 
demands for production technologies, capital, and market outlets.  The new legal framework provided 
new directions for the cooperatives’ development.  For instance, the scope of cooperative activities was 
diversified, and included integrated trade and service supply cooperatives, as well as sector-focused and 
professional cooperatives (including those for pig raising, dairy cow raising, safe vegetables, rice seedling 
supply, tea farming, sugar cane farming, fruit tree planting, and aquaculture).   
The period of 1993–2000 was considered the golden age of the market economy in Vietnam.  In 
the words of Sepehri and Arkam-Lohdi (2002), “it was the period in which it appeared that the 
Vietnamese economic dragon would finally emerge from hiding.” GDP growth was as high as 7 percent 
per year, in which agricultural growth was maintained at 4 percent and the nonagricultural sector 
accelerated to more than 8 percent.
19 It is worth noting that despite the Asian financial crisis during 1997–
2001, Vietnam still maintained an economic performance that was quite good, and to which the 
agricultural sector positively contributed with a more than 5 percent annual growth rate.
20
However, researchers questioned the sustainability of agricultural growth because it was mostly 
dependent on the incentives made by the previous land reform, decollectivization, and price liberalization.  
The focus was still on quantitative growth rather than on improving the quality and competitiveness of 
agricultural production.  Food security still dominated the options of export-oriented and commercialized 
agriculture.  The transformation of crop structure occurred very slowly.  The rural–urban income gap was 
widening and more than 70 percent of the poor were concentrated in the rural sector (World Bank 1998, 
2000).   
 This figure 
stands in contrast to the deceleration of nonagricultural growth to 6.8 percent during the Asian financial 
crisis.   
Land fragmentation was the major constraints for agricultural commercialization.  Land was 
supposed to be allocated on the basis of need (usually indicated by the size of households) and also the 
ability to farm the land (meaning, the number of household members who can work on the land).  Such 
land fragmentation imposed negative effects on production efficiency and land productivity, thus 
impeding marketed surplus and agricultural commodity exchange.
21
The efforts to develop a new style of agricultural cooperatives were not successful.  In some 
areas, relatively few cooperatives have survived for longer than a year.  Moreover, among those 
considered successful, the majority was very small, with an average capital of about 1 billion Vietnamese 
dong (VND) or US$63,000.  Cooperatives worked mostly in irrigation, plant protection, extension 
 Moreover, land markets have failed 
to develop strongly without a clear regulatory and institutional framework (Dang et al.  2005; Arkam-
Lohdi 2001; Nguyen 2006).   
                                                       
19 From the second half of the 1990s, growth was led by the industrial sector that accelerated on average at 14 percent 
annually. Growth was driven by unprecedented levels of investment, which reached a high level of 30 percent as a result of sharp 
increases in FDI that accounted for one-third of total investment. 
20 In addition, agricultural export expansion made a great contribution to financing the increasing growth of industrial 
imports. 
21 The egalitarian spirit of land regulation was undermined when wealthier individuals who had left the village for 
employment reasons could maintain their registration as residents and rent their land to other farmers. Depending on the crop 
produced, rents could amount to as much as 40 percent of farm output value, hence inhibiting new farm investment as well as 
reintroducing social stratification.  
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services, and seed and input supplies.  Only a minor proportion (9–15 percent) were engaged in soil 
preparation, credit provision, and marketing the output. 
Agricultural tax reform led to new categories of local fees imposed on rural households.  Since 
agricultural tax had previously provided the main source of rural tax revenue to the budgets of local 
governments, the tight budget constraints under the impact of structural adjustment forced the state to 
restrain its spending on rural services—such as health and education—that the cooperatives previously 
funded.  As a result, local governments were forced to supplement budgetary expenditures by levying fees 
for the provision of these services and the latter constituted the heaviest form of taxation on the rural 
population.   
Finally, food security still weighted heavily in the balance of policy objectives, therefore the state 
kept a tight control on the volume of rice exports.  The quota was set each year based on estimates of 
domestic supply and utilization.  The right to export rice under the national quota was allocated to two 
regional state-owned trading enterprises—VINAFOOD I (also known as the Northern Food Company) in 
Hanoi and VINAFOOD II (Southern Food Company) in Ho Chi Minh City—and to a number of 
provincial state-owned trading enterprises.  This state control of exports partially limited incentives to rice 
farmers.   
Reform Consolidation Efforts and Future Challenges 2001–Present: Land Market 
Liberalization, Agricultural Commercialization and International Integration 
Since 2001, reform efforts have been focused on SOEs, financial reforms, the development of factor 
markets after recovering from the Asian financial crisis, and trade liberalization to become a member of 
the WTO in 2007.  Along with international integration, policy reform measures were more influenced by 
international donors that established their support agenda around the Comprehensive Poverty Reduction 
and Growth Strategy (CPRGS), proposed by the World Bank.  This document can be interpreted as a 
major turning point in the planning processes of Vietnam.   Previous plans and strategies were very much 
based on a command view of the economy.   By contrast, CPRGS relied on spelling out clear 
development goals (such as the Vietnam Development Goals [VDGs]), using empirical evidence and 
consultation to identify the policies best suited to attain those goals, aligning resources behind those 
policies, and setting up appropriate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms.    
In agriculture, as documented in the World Bank report Vietnam: Advancing Rural Development 
from Vision to Action, policy measures focused around three pillars of rural development: (1) creating 
opportunity through accelerating market orientation, (2) managing natural assets for broad based growth, 
and (3) mainstreaming poverty reduction through inclusion and empowerment.  The goal of these policy 
measures was to push up agricultural commercialization, increase competitiveness and the value-add of 
agricultural production, improve rural livelihoods, narrow the rural–urban income gap, and promote 
agricultural sustainable growth. 
Agricultural market-based growth was enhanced further by the amendments of the Land Law in 
2001, 2003, and 2004.  The Land Law amendment in 2001 mostly permitted foreign investors to acquire 
land-use rights and attempted to promote land consolidation in agriculture.  The 2003 revision was 
introduced to simplify buying and selling procedures to make the land market operate more efficiently, 
and in so doing deepen the land market.  The 2003 Land Law allowed land-use certificate holders to buy 
and sell their usufruct rights or change the functional assignation of their land, within the overall 
indicative planning framework of the government.  In addition, land markets were also broadened through 
authorizing the communes to have the right to change the functional classification of land.  A further 
revision of the Land Law in 2004 made an important contribution to gender balance by titling the names 
of both the husband and the wife in land-use certificates. 
In 2001, the state scrapped rice export quotas and fertilizer import quotas, allowing all firms 
engaged in the domestic trade of these commodities to enter international arrangements.  Furthermore, 
reform of the taxation system that begun in 2000 has involved a phasing out of the agricultural tax.  By  
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2003, the agricultural tax raised only 1.3 percent of tax revenue and 0.1 percent of total government 
revenue (World Bank 2004).   
To speed up rural transformation, various policy measures were issued during 2000–05 to support 
private investment in the rural sector, the application of modern technologies, development of rural 
nonfarm activities, and improvements in rural physical and social infrastructures, with a focus on 
education and healthcare.  The Enterprise Law introduced in 2000 and revised in 2005 created an 
enabling environment for private investment in the rural sector.  In 2002, Decree 80 was introduced to 
promote contract farming and remove the agricultural value-chain fragmentation.  The following year, the 
government issued Resolution 28, which concretely requested that the SOEs in the agricultural sector be 
reduced in number and restructured.  Moreover, state forest enterprises (SFEs) were obliged to reform and 
relocate forest land to local communities that were mostly composed of poor ethnic groups in 
mountainous areas.   
Since 2001, Vietnam’s agricultural growth has been continuing at 3.7 percent per annum despite a 
difficult external environment of low commodity prices on world markets.  Food per capita increased 
from 420 kg in 2001 to 470 kg in 2007, ensuring national food security and enabling more than 4 million 
tons of rice export every year.  Agricultural diversification and commercialization aggressively took 
place.  Many cash crops such as coffee, rubber, black pepper, and cashew nut have gradually occupied 
important positions in the international market.  The export turnover of agricultural, forestry, and fishery 
products during the period of 2001–07 was $US49.6 billion, gaining an annual growth of 16.8 percent.  
Vietnam has become the second largest coffee exporter and the first largest exporter of Robusta coffee 
since 2000.  Within a decade from 1995, coffee production increased by three times, and Vietnam earned 
more than US$1 billion from coffee exports in 2007.  Similarly, Vietnam has become the largest exporter 
of cashew nut and pepper, accounting for more than 50 percent of world exports since 2003–04.   
Since 2007, the state has reconsidered its agricultural and rural development strategies, partly due 
to the negative impacts of the upcoming global economic recession,
22
Summary: Key Factors, Interactions, Outcomes 
 declining agricultural growth, and 
experiences in rural social stability learned from China.  Resolution 26 issued by the VCP on August 5, 
2008 made concrete efforts to promote the parallel development of agriculture–rural–peasant livelihoods.  
New policies were followed to improve peasant income, rural livelihoods, and the infrastructure system, 
in order to organically integrate agriculture and rural development into ongoing strong industrialization 
and modernization.  Resolution 26 reaffirms the transfer and exchange of land-use rights, releases 
constraints of land ceilings, promotes rural land accumulation, and gradually establishes unified and fair 
market prices for land transfers: for instance, rural–urban land and agricultural–industrial–residential 
land.  The resolution also states that industrial development policies should get stronger support in rural 
areas by focusing on agro-processing and agricultural input production industries and services.  It also 
included a premise for further agricultural investment by requesting double state investment in agriculture 
every 5 years.   
Land reform and decollectivization in Vietnam have been implemented as part of the state’s general 
economic reforms (Doi Moi).  This reform process must be seen in the context of historical events that led 
to the division of the country in 1954, the Vietnam War, its reunification, and the collectivization of the 
whole country in the 1970s.  After the war, weaknesses in the collective system became obvious.  The 
economic and food crisis in the late 1970s led the Communist Party to reconsider its economic 
development models and it provided more incentives to individuals.  The main purpose was to increase 
the efficiency of the socialist system rather than to adopt a market system. 
The momentum of partial economic reform was further strengthened by the Soviet perestroika 
and the economic crisis in the mid-1980s.  The salient events during this period were the relocation of 
                                                       
22 Decision 497 issued by the prime minister on April 17, 2009, provided a state budget of $US1 billion to support peasant 
households in purchasing agricultural intermediate input and machinery and to improve housing conditions.  
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land to farmers’ households, decollectivization in 1988, and a series of market liberalization policies from 
the late 1980s onward.  This process was gradual.      
The second half of the 1990s witnessed the golden age of Vietnam’s economic growth with 
reforms in the regulatory and institutional framework of commodity and labor markets, and intensified 
international integration.  This reform and growth period ended with the Asian financial crisis, leading the 
government to hesitate on providing further reform.  During the new millennium, following high growth 
and industrialization, Vietnam’s government furthered its economic reforms by liberalizing financial and 
land markets.   
Land reform and decollectivization can therefore not be separated from the overall Doi Moi in 
Vietnam, and it is necessary to add a stronger policy perspective to the common understanding of the 
reform process, which is characterized as bottom-up, path-dependent and crisis-driven (van Brabant 1990; 
Fforde and de Vylder 1996).  Active policy measures along with market liberalization and international 
integration, which not only generated innovative ideas but also consolidated the reform process’ 
performance and outcomes, have become more important.  In agriculture, land-tenure reform and 
decollectivization started first with peasant households, then in the 1960s and 1970s local authorities 
implemented them within the collective system.  Though keeping strictly to socialist ideologies and 
central planning, the state, under severe economic shortages, gradually accepted individual interests and 
formally illegal contract practices.  When the upcoming food crisis threatened the survival of the central 
planning and collective system, the political leadership actively reviewed those local experiments and 
scaled them up into national policies.   
In the 1990s, market liberalization was chosen to speed up economic growth and industrialization 
after a long period of hunger, poverty, and international isolation.  Under this pressure, the state played a 
more active role in consolidating reform results and looking for new options.  However, reform efforts in 
the 1990s focused more on nonagricultural sectors, as agriculture and rural development were still 
benefiting from the momentum brought about by the drastic reform through Resolution 10 in 1988.  In the 
new millennium, benefits from high economic growth again established a sound base for the state to 
reconsider its new urban-bias development strategies.  Declining agricultural growth, widening rural–
urban income gaps, and decreasing rural social stability became major factors contributing to the new 
tendency toward balancing intersectoral growth and integrating agricultural and rural development into 
the high-speed process of industrialization, modernization, and international integration (World Bank 
2008; Dang 2009).  Resolution 26 issued by the VCP in 2008 opened a new era for agricultural and rural 
development in Vietnam.   
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3.  IMPACTS OF LAND-TENURE POLICY REFORMS IN VIETNAM 
When analyzing land-tenure policy reforms, some key messages from the recent history of relatively 
mature transforming economies in central and eastern Europe and newly industrializing countries like 
China become underlined (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004).  One key message is that the allocation of land 
rights to individual households is a necessary but insufficient approach to generating incentives for 
productivity increases in agriculture, creating spread effects within and beyond the rural economy, and 
disentangling existing growth potentials.  Reforms that shift the rural economy from rigid control-and-
command farming institutions toward a market-based model combined with individual incentives can 
play an important role in stimulating economic growth (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008).  “Getting 
property rights right” has to go hand in hand with the decollectivization of labor relations and farm 
structures and with liberalizing markets for agricultural products and factors of production (Rozelle and 
Swinnen 2004).  These reforms have to be further embedded into efforts to secure property rights, 
acknowledge their temporal and permanent transfer, and strengthened with mechanisms that recognize 
land as collateral, even when the state remains the legal owner.  Land-tenure reforms thus present a major 
challenge to policymakers, such as reducing rural poverty while avoiding socially unacceptable 
inequalities in land ownership and living standards (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008).  What is then the 
impact of these comprehensive reforms on agriculture, the rural economy, and Vietnamese society as a 
whole? Is it possible in the context of a two-step reform (implementing the decollectivization of land 
rights and making rental and land sales markets dynamic) to clearly isolate cause–effect mechanisms?
23
Growth and Productivity Increases  
  
Land-tenure reforms in Vietnam have—together with complementary productivity enhancing 
instruments—generated powerful incentives to invest in farming, particularly in the intensified production 
of annual crops in the lowlands bur, as well as in perennial crops.  In turn, these reforms have induced a 
strong rural-based growth process, raising households’ incomes and their standards of living (Rozelle and 
Swinnen 2004; Beckman 2001; Henin 2002).  Since the early 1990s, Vietnam has maintained an annual 
GDP growth rate of 7.6 percent (Fritzen 2002; Minot 2003); however, these rates have slowed down at 
the turn of the millennium to only 5 percent (1998–2001) but sped up again during the last few years.  
Agricultural growth achieved its peak during the years from 1996 to 2000, showing an annual rate of 4.7 
percent; growth rates seen from a longer term perspective (from 1986 to 2005) attained a level of 3.8 
percent per annum.   
   
                                                       
23 For methodological problems and dealing with available statistics, see Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008, Chapter 3.   
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Table 1.   Agricultural growth accounting estimation in Vietnam, 1986–2005 
Period  Ag.  
GDP  










1986–90  2.7  2.5  -4.7  -1.2  -3.4  0.8  5.4   
1991–95  4.7  6.9  28.6  25.6  13.4  2.0  7.8   
1996–2000  4.9  1.3  10.5  10.3  4.0  2.7  9.8   
2001–05  3.7  1.0  5.7  4.4  1.4  1.0  3.0   
1986–2005  3.8  2.7  10.5  9.8  8.0  1.7  6.3   
Factors contributing to growth, based on their elasticities (percent) 
1986–90  2.7  0.8  -0.2  -0.1  -0.5  0.3  0.2  2.0 
1991–95  4.7  2.2  0.9  1.4  1.8  0.8  0.4  -2.8 
1996–2000  4.9  0.4  0.3  0.6  0.5  1.1  0.4  1.5 
2001–05  3.7  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.4  0.1  2.2 
1986–2005  3.8  0.9  0.3  0.5  1.1  0.7  0.3  0.0 
Percent of factors contributing to 1 percent agricultural growth  
1986–90  100.0  29.9  -5.9  -2.4  -17.1  12.4  9.2  73.9 
1991–95  100.0  47.5  19.9  29.4  37.9  17.6  7.4  -59.7 
1996–2000  100.0  8.9  7.0  11.4  10.9  22.3  9.1  30.3 
2001–05  100.0  8.5  5.1  6.5  5.2  11.4  3.7  59.5 
1986–2005  100.0  23.2  9.1  14.0  28.3  18.2  7.5  -0.3 
Elasticities (percent)  32.5  3.3  5.4  13.4  40.9  4.5   
Note: TFP is the residual of agricultural growth minus the sum of factor growth weighted by elasticities. 
Source: Nguyen, D.A.T.  2008.  Relationship between investment and agricultural growth.  Hanoi: Vietnam, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Rural Development. 
Table 1 underlines the high growth in total factor productivity from 1986 to 1990, thanks to new 
incentive structures for smallholders generated by Resolution 10.  The increasing use between 1991 and 
1995 of farm input such as fertilizers and pesticides is reflected in price increases for agricultural products 
and is partly the result of the better availability of rural credit that the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and 
Rural Development initiated in 1993.  From 1996 to 2005, the role of land expansion becomes clear, 
enabled by increasing production efficiency, more capital-intensive input, and improvements in existing 
irrigation systems.   
Private land ownership has contributed to this growth process—in part by allowing land to be 
reallocated to more efficient farmers who thereby increase aggregate output.  In his early research on the 
reform, Hayami (1994) saw the new legal framework on land as a trigger to more efficient agriculture 
without fear that an inequitable agrarian structure would emerge (Hayami 1994; Ravallion and van de 
Walle 2006).  This expectation was confirmed some 10 years later: an emerging, active land market 
contributed to more rapid poverty reduction, redirected land into the hands of the most efficient 
producers, and fostered agricultural diversification.   
Major components of this growth, which led to reduced rural poverty, are attributable to higher 
per hectare yields in rice and other crops.  These yield increases went hand in hand with the 
diversification into new or intensified non-crop endeavors, such as aquaculture, livestock breeding, and 
nonfarm activities.  The sharply different growth rates in the acreage of annual crops (1.7 percent) 
compared to perennial crops (6.3 percent) (Nguyen 2008) indicate the impact that strengthened incentives 
such as secured land-use rights for tree and shrub cultivation have had on long-term investments in land.  
With 43 percent intensification, improved irrigation and an increased application of fertilizer contributed  
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most to this growth (from 1986 to 2005), whereas labor input contributed only one-third.  Interestingly, 
total factor productivity as a residual proved irrelevant, and showed even slightly negative figures (-0.3 
percent) during the 1986–2005 period, meaning that improved factor quality arising from the reform 
process does not seem to be important, except in the context of organizational innovations during the 
early period of reform (from 1986 to 1990).   
Enhanced Tenure Security through Land-Use Certificates and Investment 
Together with expanding rental periods for annual and perennial crops, the transfer of land rights from the 
collectives to households through the 1988 Land Law as a first step, then allocating individual, inheritable 
land-use certificates (LUC) to them as a second step, resulted in a major increase in rural tenure security.  
Ravallion and van de Walle (2003, 2008) noted that lower inequality resulted (making the poorest better 
off) when land allocation through the 1988 Land Law together with simulated market-based outcomes 
were analyzed, compared to an analysis of market-force allocation alone.  Decollectivization strongly 
unleashed farmers’ incentives for investment; however, this approach needed additional steps, such as the 
introduction of titling as a second reform step in 1993 to achieve further efficiency and growth.  Once the 
approach was chosen, some arbitrariness in decisionmaking on land allocation remained; because of 
problems with enforcement, local favoritism and emerging local conflicts were the prices to be paid (Do 
and Iyer 2008). 
Beyond decollectivization, issuing land titles is considered critical to enhancing tenure security, 
promoting investment, and triggering the emergence of tenancy and land sales markets (Do and Iyer 
2008; Deininger and Jin 2008).  By 2000, nearly 11 million land certificates had been issued to rural 
households.  Regarding the scale and speed of implementation, Vietnam’s titling program has outpaced 
similar initiatives in other counties (for example, Thailand, Indonesia, and Peru) and thus has gained 
genuine interest from the developing world (Do and Iyer 2008).  Starting with a coverage rate of 24 
percent in 1994, the titling program already reached 90 percent of the rural population by 2000 (Do and 
Iyer 2008), but with variations among the provinces.  By 2003, 91 percent of rural households had been 
issued LUCs (Vietnam Development Report 2005).   
Nevertheless, the positive impacts of issuing LUCs dominate: At the community level, 
certificates have been found to be associated with higher levels in the share of total area devoted to 
perennial crops, and increased investment in irrigation (Deininger and Jin 2008).  In one highly registered 
province, a household on average increased its share of cultivated land devoted to perennials, such as 
coffee, tea, rubber, or fruits like citrus, pineapples, bananas, and mangoes, by 5.6 percent compared with a 
household in a low-registration province (Do and Iyer 2008).  Furthermore, a statistically significant 
increase in the proportion of total cultivated area devoted to perennial crops (by 7.5 percent) could be 
observed within a province in which everybody had a LUC, compared with a province in which no one 
had such a certificate.  This increase comes at the expense of annual crops, with a decline of 6.5 percent 
in the share of total cultivated area.   
In addition, titling has had a significant impact on the labor input in nonfarm activities.  
Households in high LUC-issuing provinces increased their nonfarm activities by 2.7 weeks per active 
household member as cultivating perennials normally is a labor-saving practice (Do and Iyer 2008).  New 
incentives were thus given to marketing, food processing, woodworking, and the local garment industry, 
thus diversifying rural incomes and safety nets.    
However, experiences with land-tenure reforms in other countries have shown that it would be 
naïve to think that legal prerequisites, such as the Land Law, alone would assure tenure security 
(Ravallion and van de Walle 2003).  Power struggles at the local level and the capture of rents by local 
elites may either lead to even worse distributional outcomes than before the reform or to an increased 
desire to protect the poor.  In concrete terms, despite improvements in legal security, uncertainty persists 
in the villages in some provinces on whether these rights can, for example, really be called inheritable 
rights if they will not be reallocated by the end of the 20-year use period—although government 
statements repeatedly stress that this will not happen (Saint-Macary et al. 2008).    
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From the beginning of the reform, the local authorities’ frequent reassignment of land to maintain 
land productivity resulted in underinvestment (Pingali and Xian 1992).  Case studies in Vietnam’s 
northern mountain region have shown that within the guaranteed 20-year leasehold, two phases of land 
reallocations have already occurred to accommodate new settlers in the villages.  Therefore, there is 
insufficient evidence (Saint Macary et al. 2008) that tenancy contracts under titling, from the tenants’ 
viewpoint, are more secure than the rural collectives’ practices.  Furthermore, in mountainous areas, no 
clear indicators exist that the LUC system is more secure than traditional allocation mechanisms (Neef et 
al. 2007).  For instance, case studies (though using small samples) have shown that half of the 
investigated households obtained tenure security through traditional mechanisms only.  For the remaining 
households, however, who in the past have not been able to secure rights through this system, tenure 
security for new rice terraces through titling increased (Neef et al. 2007).  Nevertheless, threats of de facto 
expropriation through land reallocations do discourage investment and technology dissemination, 
including measures to avoid soil erosion.  In some regions, tenure security thus remains an issue. 
Secured Tenancy and Rural Factor Markets  
Land Rental Markets 
As research in other countries in transition has shown, land rental and land sales markets respond 
differently to measures that increase resource access to the rural poor and enhance farm efficiency; 
therefore, short-term rental and permanent land transfers will be treated separately (Deininger and Jin 
2008).   
From the early 1990s on, high economic growth combined with an emerging strong rural nonfarm 
economy that provides new jobs are associated with a significant though regionally differentiated increase 
in land market activities (Deininger and Jin 2008).  Between 1993 and 1998, rental market participation 
more than quadrupled from 3.8 to 15.5 percent.  Although per capita expenditure increased within this 
period by 5.9 percent based on a highly egalitarian distribution (Gini coefficient of 0.26), the rural 
economy was still quite poor.  Other sources state that land market transactions increased tenfold from 2.5 
percent in 1993 to 25.0 percent in 1998 (Do and Iyer 2008).  Contrary to this promising start, rental 
markets have not increased in importance over time (Brandt et al.  2006).  In 2004, only 3.61 percent of 
all agricultural land was rented, with 10.7 percent renting in and 6.0 percent renting out.  However, for 
households renting in, tenancy plots are the source of nearly a third of their managed lands.   
During early phases of market development, rental transactions did not involve direct payments 
from current users to owners, although land users already had to pay land taxes.  During liberalization, 
fixed rental contracts and sharecropping quickly gained importance (Deininger and Jin 2008).  This 
situation should be of interest to future researchers who can consider the strong orientation toward 
efficiency and good performance of tenants (those who agreed to fixed rental contracts) on the one hand, 
while weighing the risks, vulnerability, and equity issues (sharecropping) on the other hand.   
Who is active in rental markets? Deininger and Jin (2008) state that agricultural plots are 
transferred preferentially to only those households having limited asset endowments but a high level of 
agricultural abilities (Deininger and Jin 2008).  Consequently, they have been able to increase the 
productivity of land by transferring resources exactly to those producers who can make better use of 
them.  At the same time, rental markets allowed those whose comparative advantage is not in agriculture 
to provide land rentals and join nonagricultural sectors, where they gain a higher remuneration for their 
labor.  Transfers positively impact not only efficiency but also equity standards.  Neither female headed 
households nor those being threatened by adverse shocks are discriminated against in accessing local 
rental markets.  However, some elements of discrimination do exist, as smallholders in the most 
productive age are preferred to the old age strata.   
Regarding the scope and performance of rental markets, it is impossible to generalize because 
strong regional differences exist.  Motives for renting out land are manifold; however, there is no 
evidence that they are dominated by the perceived low abilities of landlords, or by too-large landholdings  
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for which, because of supervision problems, self-cultivation and the employment of agricultural labor 
may be inefficient or too risky. 
Land Sales Markets 
The fast development of rental markets was also accompanied by a re-emergence of land sales 
transactions.  In the 1990s, informal, illegal land markets developed where land is not only mortgaged and 
rented but also bought and sold (Henin 2002).  In the beginning, the scope of permanent transactions was 
weak due to substantial underreporting; land sales were forbidden and a tax was imposed on all land 
transactions (Do and Iyer 2003).  By circumventing these regulations, more and more people bought land 
without having been impeded by credit market imperfections (Deininger and Jin 2003).  Compared to 
rental arrangements, the expansion of land sales markets developed in an even more pronounced way, 
initiated by those households who remained active in agriculture.  In fact, market activities increased from 
1 percent of producers in 1993 to 7.2 percent in 1998.   
However, the positive impact of land sales markets to rural poverty reduction remains limited 
because resource-poor producers could rent land but not buy it.  This situation applies to female headed 
households in particular.  “Neither the 1993 Land Law, nor the land titling process appear to have had an 
appreciable effect on the volume of land market activity” (Brandt et al. 2006, 2).  At the same time, those 
who opt to leave agriculture will rent out land but not necessarily sell their rural holdings, which serve as 
a safety net.  Therefore, attained farming abilities, the level of local nonfarm development, as well as the 
security of land rights strongly determine the operation of rural land markets, with rental markets having a 
pioneering impact on both equity and productive efficiency.   
In this context, the role of bureaucracy in dealing with land sales markets is unclear.  Do they 
tacitly facilitate or constrict permanent transfers? Have local administrators, driven by fear of losing 
influence within control-and-command allocation, inhibited the development of land markets, or are they 
actively supporting transfers for rent-seeking reasons? On the one hand, due to a lively transfer of plots 
without titles, a quasi market largely independent of state control has emerged (Ravaillon and van der 
Walle 2008).  On the other hand, evidence exists that local authorities tried to stop poor families from 
selling their lands in order to protect them against the dynamics of land markets.  The local state thus 
continues to play an active role in setting the terms of land transactions as a measure to prevent 
landlessness (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008). 
These ad hoc interventions may result in making the village even worse off (Ravaillon and van de 
Walle 2008) if illegal transactions develop as a result of prohibitions offering less favorable contract 
terms to vulnerable households that must sell after adverse shocks.  As a consequence of emergency sales, 
wealthier households will accumulate land.  New landlord–tenant relations may thus develop, with land 
concentration and the hiring of agricultural labor becoming re-emerging issues, which will indicate new 
dynamics in rural labor markets.    
Rural Credit Markets 
Having received an LUC that is regarded as legitimate should improve a rural household’s access to 
credit, particularly from formal banking institutions such as commercial or rural cooperative banks (Do 
and Iyer 2008; Ravaillion and van de Walle 2008).  However, there is insufficient evidence that recent 
credit market development will complement ongoing land-tenure reforms, facilitate permanent land 
transfers, and contribute to higher rural investment (Do and Iyer 2008).  In the late 1990s, access to 
formal credit remained limited: The share of producers having credit access increased from 9.0 to 21.0 
percent between 1993 and 1998, with more than one third in the Mekong Delta while other regions 
remain relatively low (Deininger and Jin 2008).  Following this line, credit market institutions are not yet 
fully developed and focused toward new demands for loans.
24
                                                       
24 Some years ago, the major lender in rural areas had been the state-owned Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural 
Development (Do and Iyer 2003) 
 Although access to credit in rural Vietnam  
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is apparently related to land market reforms, during which the government gave land title equivalents to 
households, the linkages between land and credit markets remain weak.  Nevertheless, a strata of landless 
poor already emerged that is not well served, either by formal or informal credit institutions (Kemper and 
Klump 2009; Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008)  
The volume of credit did not increase significantly after land reforms, and the ability of 
households to borrow is still low (Do and Iyer 2008).  Case study data show that approximately only half 
of all households have outstanding loans.  Interestingly, the probability of receiving a loan goes down by 
11.0 percentage points when a province implements the land reform fully.  It is important to note that the 
amounts borrowed as a fraction of total household expenditure is lower in households within highly 
registered provinces.  Additionally, there is no change in the fraction of loans from formal sources after 
tenure reform is implemented.  “Overall, these results do not suggest a positive impact of the LUC on 
households’ ability to borrow in the post-reform period.” (Do and Iyer 2003, 16).  Thus, the Land Law 
has not been very effective in alleviating credit constraints for rural households (Do and Iyer 2008).  The 
argument that households in provinces issuing land titles are wealthier and thus better prepared to finance 
the purchase of land out of their equity does not hold either: Households in high-issuing provinces show a 
smaller increase in real household expenditures than those in low-issuance provinces.  Case studies in 
other regions of the country underline the fact that even after the issuing LUCs, rural households remain 
excluded from formal lending institutions because land is not yet well acknowledged as collateral (Henin 
2002).  These studies further stress that the linkage between land and credit markets has not yet been fully 
acknowledged, and as a result, there are efficiency losses and investment shortages.  Research from the 
Ha Tinh region shows that due to local authorities’ continued control of land transfers, commercial banks 
in the regions do not accept LUCs as collateral (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2003).   
Food Security and Nutrition Status 
As stated previously, the liberalization of Vietnamese agriculture has proceeded in a series of small steps 
rather than a big bang approach—with land-tenure reform being a key element to encouraging 
individualized decisionmaking and a new entrepreneurial spirit (Pingali and Xuan 1992).  In the 
beginning, reforms that responded to rising food insecurity, farmers’ unrest, and insufficient nutritional 
status had to be pushed ahead.  Already in the early 1990s, Pingali and Xuan (1992) stated that 
encouraging the family contract system had a significant effect on rice productivity, transforming 
Vietnam from a rice importer to one of world’s largest exporters.  Annual growth in rice yields per 
hectare of land had risen by about 32 percent in North Vietnam and 24 percent in South Vietnam from 
1980 to 1984 (Pingali and Xuan 1992).  Most of this growth had been attributed to increases in yields per 
hectare rather than expansions in cultivated areas.  During this period, annual rice output per capita 
increased by about 40 kg for the whole of the country, underlining the newly generated potential for 
improved food security and nutritional status.   
Rice is by far the most important staple food in the Vietnamese diet, and it is consumed in nearly 
all households (99.9 percent).  In fact, rice is satisfying about 75 percent of the total calorific intake of a 
typical Vietnamese household.
25 Therefore, the continuing increase in per capita rice production in the 
1990s has contributed to increased food security (Minot and Goletti 2000).  What is more, to ensure an 
adequate domestic supply of rice the Vietnamese government levied rice export quotas during this time 
equivalent to an export tax of 20 to 25 percent.
26
As reforms stabilized the economy, rice prices have become less volatile and have substantially 
increased during the 1990s, directly impacting Vietnamese households—72 percent of which both 
  
                                                       
25 By contrast the three minor staples (maize, cassava, and sweet potatoes) together represent less than 8 percent of the value 
of consumption expenditure and less than 4 percent of caloric intake (Minot and Goletti 2000). 
26 Although export quotas can be criticized for many reasons and have shown a resurrection during the food crisis of 2007, it 
should be underlined that for Vietnam the simulation modeling shows that a complete elimination of this quota system would 
have led to an additional increase in rice prices by 14 to 22 percent, with adverse effects on urban and other nonfarm rural 
households (Minot and Goletti 2000).  
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produced and consumed rice.  As such, surplus rice-producing regions would have realized a net benefit 
from rising prices, whereas deficit regions would lose (Minot and Goletti 2000).  On average, higher rice 
prices would benefit rural households at the expense of urban households.  Simulation models have 
shown that a uniform 10 percent increase in rice prices would hurt mainly urban households, nonfarms, 
and families living in the five rice-deficit regions, although the effect on real income would be less than 2 
percent on average.  Price increases would benefit farmers, however, particularly those in the rice bowl 
areas (Minot and Goletti 2000).  As poverty entails vulnerability and as poverty in Vietnam is still rural, 
these figures highlight the potential the reforms created to reduce food insecurity and improve nutritional 
status by attacking some roots of rural poverty.   
Changes in rice production and prices are thus likely to have a significant impact on the welfare 
of Vietnamese households and on rural and urban poverty levels (Niimi et al. 2004).  During the 1990s, 
per capita rice consumption was relatively stable.  Given that per capita GDP increased during that time at 
about 6.0 percent annually, the implication is that the income elasticity of rice demand is close to zero 
(Minot and Goletti 2000).  As could be expected, rice consumption varies regionally and is closely 
correlated to urbanization and incomes, with the more urbanized and richer southern regions consuming 
less rice.  Rice still plays a major role in the expenditures of the poorest quintile of the population (47 
percent) and in the poorer rural areas, with 163 kg compared with 127 kg for urban households.  For low-
income levels, rice is a normal good; however, beyond certain income levels, rice consumption begins to 
fall and is substituted with meat, eggs, and dairy products (Minot and Goletti 2000).  In concrete terms, 
some nutritional indicators showed a rapid improvement between 1993 and 1998, with stunting rates for 
children younger than age five decreasing from 53 percent to only 33.4 percent.  Rates for underweight 
children younger than age five have declined much more sluggishly (Fritzen 2002).  These observed 
changes in nutritional patterns—the larger diversification in food intake in particular—have had a positive 
impact on the average nutritional status of the Vietnamese.   
Changes in Farming Systems and Agrarian Structures 
Market reforms have radically transformed agricultural production and rural structures not only in the rice 
growing plains but also in the more remote upland villages (Henin 2002).  In both regions, state 
cooperatives have been dissolved and substituted by family farms, mainly consisting of individual 
households that formed the membership of these cooperatives (Beckman 2001).  Together with the land, 
other means of production, such as capital goods, have also been handed over to the new family farms. 
In the first reform phase in the 1990s, per household land endowments remained small although 
variable across regions with an average of 0.3 hectares of annual and 0.06 hectares of perennial crops 
(Deininger and Jin 2008).  In the densely populated Red River Delta, average farm size is only about 0.25 
hectares, whereas in the Mekong Delta, families cultivate on relatively large farms of 1.1 hectares (Minot 
and Goletti 2000; Deininger and Jin 2008).  Land distribution did not lead to a significant increase in land 
inequality during the 1990s—on the contrary, the national Gini coefficient for per capita land 
endowments had declined slightly from 0.53 to 0.50.  However, regional differences persist, illustrated by 
the difference in the national per capita land endowment Gini coefficient, ranging between 0.34 and 0.37, 
for the southeast and the Mekong Delta, where it is much higher.  Extending the survey period from 1993 
to 2004, the Gini coefficient for rural household per capita land rose from 0.49 to 0.64, which is a 
remarkable change (Brandt et al. 2006).   
Although land assignment to households was initially equitable, with a focus on giving commune 
members roughly the same irrigated land, some households ended up with less land than would have been 
the case in a competitive market allocation (Ravallion and van de Walle 2006).  This process also led to 
the fragmentation of holdings in the form of small, dispersed plots, generating some efficiency losses.  In 
2004, the average number of plots was 4.3 per rural household, with a mean of 4.9 in the Red River Delta 
and only 2.0 in the Mekong River Delta (Brandt et al. 2006).  With land consolidation projects having 
started, the number of plots is again declining.  
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As part of these impacts on agrarian structures, predominant farming systems and cropping 
patterns changed considerably within only a few years.  Besides increased investment in irrigation 
systems and rice production, a higher share in total agricultural area became devoted to perennial crops 
due to enhanced tenure security for these cultures (Deininger and Jin 2008).  Through a stepwise 
improvement of tenure security for perennial crops in particular, land cultivated with these two types of 
cropping changed  remarkably during the reform process (Do and Iyer 2008): Plots dedicated to multiyear 
cropping significantly increased at the expense of annual crops, with the coffee boom in Vietnam being 
one indicator.    
Poverty Reduction and Equity Issues 
Impact on Rural Poverty 
Agricultural growth has to be seen as the main way of escaping poverty (Ravaillon and van de Walle 
2008).  Several key factors initiated this growth and consequent decline in rural poverty, with land-tenure 
reform being one of them (Beckmann 2001).  When more than 50 percent of the labor force is still 
employed in agriculture and the major share of consumer income is spent on food, reforms in the 
agricultural sector can have a major impact on poverty reduction (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). 
Regarding the first reform of decollectivization and the privatizing of land-use rights, two 
modeled benchmarks apply: (1) equal allocation of each commune’s land per capita and (2) a 
consumption-efficient allocation equalizing expected consumption or utility that coincides with market-
based land allocation (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008).  Efficient and equal land allocation together 
hypothetically would have resulted in slightly lower poverty rates (two percentage points) than the actual 
rates.  If, however, the poverty lines used at that time (early 1990s) were applied—and if a purely market-
based land allocation were implemented—instead of the ones used in the model, poverty incidence would 
have been higher.  When differentiating among the rural poor, the result become more evident: 
Nationally, mean consumption gains from privatizing land rights are about 15 percent for the poorest, 
with losses of about 20 percent for the richest.  However, interregional differences apply, reflecting the 
specific pre-socialist situation in South Vietnam.  Decentralized reform resulted in a more equitable 
outcome than would have been expected from a purely consumption-efficient one through land markets.  
In general, “it seems that an effort was made to protect the poorest and reduce overall inequality at the 
expense of overall consumption (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008, 97).” The researchers went on to say 
that, “Clearly, both equity and efficiency were valued positively.”  
The second reform stage was to introduce markets in privatized land-use rights.  Those 
households, having started with inefficiently low amounts of croplands in the first phase, increased their 
holdings over time and vice versa for land-rich users.  Market forces tended to favor the “land poor” and 
those who are well-rooted in rural society, namely male headed households and the better educated.  If 
this process was a poverty-increasing driving force, then it has to be analyzed by the dynamics of rural 
landlessness (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008).  In other words, is there a poverty increasing 
landlessness effect?  
Those empirical studies that were based on datasets from the 1990s have problems in showing 
how an improvement of tenure security by LUCs links to increased lifetime income and expenditure 
patterns (Do and Iyer 2008).  The time lag between the issuing of the Land Law in 1993 and the data 
collection period of 1997–98 only allows for transitional outcomes.  For instance, investments in 
perennial crops and trees pay off only after a minimum of four years.  While credit constraints and 
rationing exist, consumption can fall even in periods of investment.   
Extending the observation period leads to more diversified results.  For instance, during the 
period 1993–2004, there was not only a reduction in landlessness among the poorest, but also, the trend 
rate of poverty reduction between 1993–2004 is slightly higher for the landless than for the rest of the 
rural population, with the exception of the Mekong Delta, which has a unique history of land ownership 
(Ravaillion and van de Walle 2008).  Overall, rising landlessness in Vietnam has been poverty reducing,  
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an effect that is statistically significant.  Thus, land market development and titling strongly contribute to 
overall poverty reduction in rural areas.  Rising landlessness as a by-product of the reforms has not 
jeopardized the gains of the poor, and has not counteracted the first reform step.   
However, regional differences in poverty reduction can be observed: whereas improvements in 
rural standards of living occurred mainly in the rice growing areas in the lowlands during the last two 
decades, poverty persisted in the highlands, mostly due to a continuing lack of access to complementary 
productive factors in agriculture.  Impediments included not only limited access to irrigation water, 
agricultural credit, and markets, but also insufficient access to land (Henin 2002). 
Although the direct impact of tenure reforms cannot be imputed from more recent rural poverty 
figures because of assignment issues, the general trends in the decline of rural poverty are evident 
(Vietnam Development Report 2008).  Household survey data from 2006 confirm the continued reduction 
of poverty in Vietnam: The fraction of households living below the poverty line reached only 16 percent, 
compared with 28.9 percent in 2002 and 58.1 percent in 1993, the year the Land Law was issued.  As 
such, about 35 million people moved above the Vietnamese poverty line.  (These positive changes apply 
independently from the methodologies applied for poverty measurement).  The Vietnam Development 
Report 2005 clearly attributes the strong decline of rural households living in poverty, from 46 percent in 
1998 to 36 percent in 2002, to successful land reforms combined with agricultural product market 
liberalization (Vietnam Development Report 2005).  Even methodological problems in adequately 
measuring poverty should not divert from the impressive performance of Vietnam in its attempts to 
reduce poverty (Vietnam Development Report 2007).  Compared with any other country in the region, 
including China, Vietnam has reduced poverty much faster.   
Most of the poor still live in rural areas but it is the rapid decline in rural poverty that is reducing 
poverty at a national level.  Using the food poverty indicator, which gives an idea of the incidence of 
(temporary) hunger in rural areas, 9 percent of rural households are still affected, reaching 29 percent for 
ethnic minority households.  In other words, around 13.5 million people still live in poverty and 5 to 6 
million remain food poor; however, even food poor people are moving close to the poverty line.   
Regional poverty differences remain wide: People in the mountainous areas are much poorer than 
the lowland population.  Rural poverty is greatest in the remote upland areas in the northern and the north 
central coast areas with poverty rates varying widely between districts and communes (Minot et al. 2006).  
A combination of fast declines in poverty in the poorer areas and a slower decline in the richer ones is 
actually resulting in a narrowing of the poverty gap and a convergence between regions (Vietnam 
Development Report 2008).   
Asset Distribution and Landlessness  
While efficiency gains from land-tenure reforms are undisputed, the effects on income, wealth 
distribution, and equity issues are controversially discussed.  From a macro perspective, considerable 
equity benefits dominate after nearly two decades of reforms (Deininger and Jin 2003).  Land allocation, 
the Vietnamese approach of titling through LUC and securing land rights, has at least partially initiated a 
wave of investment in agriculture, particularly in irrigated rice production in northern Vietnam, and thus 
contributed to a more equal asset distribution even in mountainous regions (Neef et al. 2007).   
Nevertheless, there is some disputable evidence on the question of whether formalizing land 
rights and land market development has created an increase in landlessness,
27
                                                       
27 A household is landless if it has no land other than the land it rents, resides on, or if it follows shifting cultivation. 
Households that offer land rentals are “noncultivating” ones (Rvaillon and van de Walle 2008, 53) 
 as people are now able to 
sell land in times of need.  In fact, anecdotal reports and even more normative statements attest to rising 
landlessness, particularly in the Mekong Delta (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008).  Conversely, Do and 
Iyer (2008) state that the proportion of landless households has decreased in the 1990s from 11.4 to about 
7 percent; however, these trends are similar across high-issuance and low-issuance provinces of titling so 
that a clear effect cannot be identified.  They found no evidence that the 1993 Land Law resulted in major 
changes in land distribution in Vietnam.  Data based on the Vietnam Living Standard Survey from 2004  
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state that 85.6 percent of all households report having agriculture-related land, with about 94 percent in 
the Red River Delta in North Vietnam and only 61.2 percent in South Vietnam (Brandt et al. 2006), 
reflecting also historical differences.  Yet the percentage of rural households with land has fallen from 
92.2 percent in 1993 to 89.7 percent in 1998 and 85.6 percent in 2004. 
How to interpret rising landlessness in the aftermath of the agrarian reforms? One line of 
argument holds that starting from relatively equitable land distribution, land market reforms have created 
new rural class structures as they allowed rich farmers to buy land from poor farmers, who then became 
poor landless laborers.  The other line holds that the more affluent have become landless as they shift 
partially out of farming into occupations with higher labor remuneration.  In this way, rising landlessness 
and falling poverty happen together as part of a wider process of economic transition (Ravaillon and van 
de Walle 2008).  If consumption is taken as a proxy for wealth, then models show 10 years after the 
implementation of the Land Law that the poorest tend to be the least likely to be landless in Vietnam.   
If landlessness increases, how should it be assessed? More to the point, “does rising rural 
landlessness in the wake of market-oriented reforms signal an emerging new poverty concern for 
Vietnam, or is it simply a by-product of poverty reduction?” (Ravallion and van de Walle 2006, 21) For 
some researchers, rising land inequality is a bad development even if it is accompanied by less poverty.  
Other views focus on raising absolute levels of living accompanied by a partial shift out of farming—the 
selling of lands and resulting inequalities being an acceptable by-product of strengthening tenure rights 
and allowing for land market development.  Following this interpretation, which is favored by 
economists, both rising landlessness and falling poverty jointly reflect a process of economic transition 
enabled by the introduction of land markets following land-tenure reforms. 
Land-Use Rights and Gender Equality 
Enforceable rights to real property enhance the potential of both women and men to use property for 
economic purposes in the most efficient way.  However, women’s access to land often depends on their 
marital status, so that unmarried and divorced women who significantly contribute to agricultural labor 
input on the land are rarely named on titles.  Similarly, land certificates only bear the name of husbands 
(World Bank 2002).  In Vietnam, land-tenure certificates had space for only one name per family 
resulting in the systematic discrimination of women and disregard of their contribution to productivity 
increases and welfare generation.   
Through pilot project initiatives, this imbalance is already addressed with revised certificates that 
name both women and men as the rights holder, thus creating incentives for women in particular to invest 
in land and reap its benefits in case of divorce or widowhood.  This is possible only if strong partnerships 
are developed with local government representatives who support such innovative approaches, which put 
existing informal rules and power relations into question.  From their research showing that women are 
not discriminated against in land rental and land sales markets, Deininger and Jin (2008) suggest that it is 
all the more important to ease access to these markets for women through gender-balanced titling 
systems.   
Regional Differences   
Preexisting differences between North Vietnam and South Vietnam have not yet been eliminated through 
market reforms (Deininger and Jin 2008; Ravaillon and van der Walle 2006, 2008).  In the Mekong Delta, 
for example, villagers had resisted forced collectivization (see Section 2)—only 10 percent had been 
organized in collectives.  In North Vietnam, however, nearly all the land was collectivized (Ravaillon and 
van de Walle 2008).  As a consequence, the spirit of a market economy remained more developed in the 
south, where adjustments through land reallocation were more easily implemented at an individual farm 
level.  On the other hand, North Vietnam apparently had developed strong formal and informal 
institutions for collectively dealing with risks in agriculture.  Contrary to the Mekong Delta, farmers in 
the north suffering from external shocks will almost never need to sell their land in order to cope with  
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these shocks (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008).  A much longer and intensified tradition and experience 
with collectivized agriculture and local networking have helped them to cope.   
Case studies in North and South of Vietnam have shown that the province level Gini coefficient 
of land ownership declines over time.  The decrease is mainly attributable to the south where it fell from 
0.58 to 0.50 and started from a much higher level of inequality than in the north, which remained constant 
at around 0.37.  As land-tenure reform is only one major element to transforming rural society, research 
cannot easily provide answers on the question of how much inequality is attributable to the land factor 
and how much to other factors? In general, socioeconomic disparities have increased within and among 
rural communities, most markedly in lowland rice areas or villages close to towns where structural 
reforms are occurring hand in hand with economic diversification (Henin 2002).  Beyond single reports 
on increasing landlessness in South Vietnam, there is no supportive evidence on sharply rising income or 
consumption inequality in rural areas (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2008). 
What might be expected as a future outcome of tenure reform on distributional issues are 
intergenerational problems triggered by relatively high population growth, as it is often the young 
households consisting of just married couples having left their parents’ homestead who lack access to 
land (Beckman 2001).  Land legislation thus cannot be separated from family law because it provide 
orientation in cases of inheritance.   
Governance and Power Relations 
The impact of a new legal framework for land access and transaction cannot be underestimated: Securing 
property rights matters and it is up to government organizations at different levels to support and finance 
institutions that ensure security (Deininger 2003).  The Land Law together with its implementing 
directives has allowed rental and sales markets to emerge.  It has made possible a more efficient 
allocation of land, enabling economies of scale in agriculture and yield increases, and is inducing 
demand-driven land consolidation of highly fragmented plots.  However, as market economies depend on 
decentralized decisionmaking, competition, and innovativeness, a reformed legal framework elaborated 
by the central state is by far not enough for reforms to work well.  Vietnam’s diverse ecosystems and 
agricultural systems, economic gaps between favored and disadvantaged regions, and cultural differences 
call for a multilayered governance system.  In Vietnam, national legislation is transformed into rules and 
regulations applicable at the local level; therefore, devolution and governance issues are relevant in fully 
assessing the impact of reforms for local users and stakeholders.   
In northern Vietnam, the national government is aiming at large-scale devolution of the use, 
management, and governance of land and forest resources (Neef et al. 2007).  In Dak Lak province, the 
local government has transferred forests formerly owned and managed by state enterprises to the local 
people.  It is now their duty to protect and certify the forests, and enforce protection contracts (Thanh and 
Sikor 2006).  It is not surprising that such a far reaching devolution of responsibilities has created new 
problems: Case studies show that devolution resulted in discrepancies between formal legal rights, actual 
interpreted rights, and forest-use practices.  The scope and reach of actual rights has become an issue of 
intense negotiations or even conflicts among actors involved in local resource use (Thanh and Sikor 
2006). 
There is evidence that land market development is restricted as long as local political authorities 
retain their old handed-over power on land.  The local state in Vietnam continues to play an active role in 
setting the terms of land-use conversions.  Local party cadres still oversee titling, define land-use 
restrictions, and declare land appropriation for infrastructure (Ravaillon and van de Walle 2003, 2006).  
Poor farmers have protested about inadequate compensation in cases of redistribution and misconduct by 
local officials.  Yet it is the same authorities who are often defending villagers’ interests against national 
ones, specifically regarding public infrastructure.  Land-tenure reform did not undermine the power of the 
local state when considering, for example, the administration’s role in the periodic reallocations that are 
in response to demographic changes and new family formations.  Concerns on the institutional quality  
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and sustainability of the reforms arise as, for example, perceptions of corruption in officialdom already 
ranked among the highest in the world with an upward trend (Fritzen 2002).   
Impact on Natural Environment 
The impact of land-tenure reforms on resource protection is multidimensional.  When estimating the 
determinants of farmers’ decisionmaking to invest in agroforestry, particularly in soil conservation 
technologies, the reform impact appears considerable.  The issuing of LUCs has led to a significant 
increase in the adoption of agroforestry practices, including the development of ditches (Saint-Macary et 
al.  2008).  In North Vietnam, increasing investment in rice terraces due to higher tenure security has led 
to stronger protection against erosion on steep slopes.  Enhanced tenure security on agricultural lands thus 
supports solutions for environmental concerns (Neef et al. 2007).  Compared with other direct 
approaches, such as the planting of hedges or contour strips, this effect seems to be far more reaching and 
durable. 
Regarding farming systems other than intensive irrigated rice cultivation, case studies show that 
the impact of individual property rights may have negative effects on endangered ecosystems: allocating 
land rights to families leads to a conversion of rural wetlands into agricultural land.  As utilization rights 
depend necessarily on using plots in question for agricultural purposes or allocating them to new settlers, 
the common pool management of the wetlands is in danger.  Those areas with the highest agricultural 
potential become privatized while others shift to open access (Adger and Luttrell 2000).  Additionally, 
concerns arise that market reforms have undermined collective action to ameliorate flooding hazards 
(Adger 1999, 2000).  Consequently, land privatization together with reduced public expenditure might 
exacerbate the vulnerability to coastal flooding.  These risks are aggravated by the diminishing role of 
former rural cooperatives to provide local public goods, such as protection against floods or other 
hazards.  
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4.  SUSTAINABILITY OF THE APPROACH 
Assigning long-term use rights, titling land, and thus allowing for temporary and permanent land 
transactions had a statistically significant impact on long-term agricultural investments as well as on 
nonfarm activities in rural Vietnam (Do and Iyer 2008).  However, the results were not yet large in 
magnitude.  Land-tenure policy reform in Vietnam does not stand alone as a single reform instrument.  It 
was a key element of a broader reform process that includes complementary incentives to develop rural 
product and factor markets (Rozelle and Swinnen 2004).  Enabled through land-tenure reform, land rental 
and sales markets had a positive impact on agricultural productivity as well as on overall growth.  As for 
economic and social sustainability, creating private land rights strongly contributed to making the 
transition process toward a market economy in Vietnam irreversible.  It also generated the necessary 
economic incentives for family farms, made the agricultural sector an engine of economic growth, and 
changed social structures in rural areas.   
The reforms provide opportunities for households with higher abilities for good farm 
management and innovativeness to access land.  Even producers with smaller initial endowments started 
to offer parcels for rent after the barriers that prevented land access vanished.  Some researchers give 
credit to the gradual sequencing of reforms, which initially focused on rising incentives, namely 
decollectivization, and property rights reforms and the delay of major changes to the marketing system 
(Rozelle and Swinnen 2004). 
Financial sustainability of the intervention requires the public to establish tenure institutions 
entailing a public good element—even if land administration may be partly privatized in the future.  No 
discussions are yet taking place about the degree to which a partial recuperation of public funds is 
possible through land transfer taxes, which are important as a local tax source in other countries.  The 
positive indirect effects of supporting the social and political sustainability of the intervention include 
relatively egalitarian land ownership and the rapid growth of off-farm opportunities (Deininger and Jin 
2008).  Off-farm opportunities form the basis of a broad rural development process.  There is, however, a 
feedback mechanism reinforcing the impact of tenure reforms: Nonagricultural employment will be an 
additional trigger for further development of land rental markets as those leaving agriculture will 
contribute to the total supply of land.  Land-tenure reforms have triggered a sustaining process that will 
relieve the country from food insecurity, combat hunger, and improve the nutritional status of the rural 
and urban population.  Due to the improved health status and the decreased vulnerability of households in 
this specific field, the conditions for forming human capital and better education for youth have become 
more favorable.   
However, besides these many positive outcomes, new obstacles have arisen that may undermine 
the reform process’ sustainability.  How vulnerable does the poor remain, how vulnerable will they be in 
future amidst the challenges of global change, climate change in particular, and to what degree have the 
tenure reforms contributed to cushioning negative effects? Even if landlessness is not a key problem in 
Vietnam, other risks endangering sustainability arise: Although devolution is on its way in Vietnam, local 
governments still lack incentives to balance private and public interests and, together with landowners 
and users, to manage the lands in a sustainable way.  This may refer, for example, to local land-use plans.   
Empirical evidence shows that secured land tenure fosters investment in agroforestry and 
perennial systems, even in soil conservation measures.  LUCs encourage higher adoption of land 
conservation attempts, like ditches and other anti-erosion practices.  However, the distribution of LUCs 
and resulting effects on land conservation measures should be closely monitored.  Accessing secured land 
rights must not imply an accelerated conversion of forests, pastures, or wetlands into the private domain, 
which might not only lead to unsustainable production that endangers the delivery of ecosystem services 
and biodiversity but also to delinking the rural poor from income streams arising from common pool 
resources such as non-timber products or fodder. 
Although several negative feedback mechanisms can be expected as secondary effects of land 
reform, particularly related to equity and income distribution as well as environmental issues, the positive  
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effects on economic, social, and ecological sustainability dominate.  This success makes the reform 
project a crucial step in attacking the roots of rural poverty; transforming the Vietnamese rural economy; 
and as people react to economic incentives, generating new backward and forward linkages in rural 
sectors.  
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5.  LESSONS LEARNED FROM LAND-TENURE REFORM IN VIETNAM 
Land-tenure reforms that enable a peaceful transition from a centrally planned economy to a market 
economy will never achieve their objectives if they are not interlinked with other components such as 
reforming agricultural product markets, the factor input supply, and complementary rural factor markets, 
including labor and credit.   
Within the land-tenure reform package, generating stronger economic incentives for rural 
producers is critical, as is illustrated in Vietnam’s household responsibility model based on the 
decollectivization of cooperatives, the distribution of land-use rights, and market liberalization.   
These incentives will never materialize as long as complementary agricultural policy reforms are 
not successfully implemented.  These complementary policies imply accepting the price as an indicator of 
scarcity and liberalizing marketing channels such as input delivery and support service systems.  This 
process is often accompanied by, at least temporarily, government intervention into these markets, as 
demonstrated by the example of the rice export quota.   
As for land-based incentives, strong instruments and clear signals for enhanced tenure security 
are critically important, especially regarding the duration of leaseholder rights for annual and perennial 
crops.  High investment in sustainable agriculture, particularly in soil conservation and agroforestry 
systems, will happen only if long-term, inheritable tenure rights are accorded to the families.  Vietnam’s 
trial-and-error approach with adjustments made for leasehold periods is understandable from a political 
point of view, but it might have caused delays in the successful implementation of reform in the villages. 
However, a flexible, incremental approach to designing, sequencing, and implementing the 
reform has advantages as all different steps have to be legitimized not only at a national political level but 
also for the local administration in districts and communes.  A lot of information and communication are 
necessary to break resistance against reforms and to win over various stakeholders. 
Land-tenure reforms have to go hand in hand with organizational reforms at lower levels, 
including a decentralized land allocation and registration system as well as conflict resolution 
mechanisms that the rural population can address.  Many case study results show that a local 
administration can either play a very supportive or a negative role in reform implementation.  Lower-level 
administration is generally only as good as its financial backing for the delivery of local to regional public 
goods.  It is therefore necessary to also interpret decentralization and devolution in terms of cost recovery 
mechanisms to limit fiscal burdens and align decisionmaking with financial sources.  As such, a 
constructive discussion on the merits and limitations of land taxes must be initiated, even if such a tax 
may create distributional problems and burdens for the rural poor.    
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